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AbstractAre party switchers successful at furthering their careers? Most research on party switching focuses on the decision to switch and with which party to affiliate. Less attention is paid to the costs and benefits of switching parties. Moreover, previous research examining the electoral success of party switchers has often ignored how costs vary between the candidate selection process and the general election. This study addresses this gap in the literature by using original data on the careers of Mexican federal deputies to examine the costs and benefits of switching parties at the candidate selection stage and during general elections. The results suggest that party switchers are more successful at winning ballot access than nonswitchers but are less likely to win office. These results help explain why ambitious politicians would switch parties, given the known risks of changing party affiliation.

To what extent do external actors control the careers of national legislators in federal systems? Although previous research has demonstrated that multiple principals shape legislative behavior in federal systems, prior studies have been much less successful at demonstrating the relative power of each of these actors over the careers of federal legislators. Using an original data set on the career paths of Mexican federal legislators, this study seeks to determine the relative importance of governors, presidents, and other party elites in shaping the future career choices of national legislators in federal systems. I find that legislators who share partisanship with the president or their governor are more likely to obtain patronage positions, while party leaders predominantly control access to the ballot. The findings also suggest that while governors and presidents can influence a subset of legislators, the large majority of legislators pursue future positions over which party leaders control access.

Previous research on term‐limited legislators suggests they have few incentives to engage in pork‐barreling. Using the case of Mexico, where all legislators are term‐limited, I find legislators participate in federal budget negotiations despite the lack of a reelection incentive. I argue term‐limited legislators are progressively ambitious and use interventions into the budget process to further their careers. I find legislators elected in single‐member districts submit more budget amendments than those elected through proportional representation, conditional on where they intend to pursue future office. I also find governors and gubernatorial elections influence the submission of budget amendments, which is related to gubernatorial influence over political careers.

AbstractWhy do politicians in Mexico switch parties? The party-switching literature suggests that politicians generally switch parties for office-seeking or policy-seeking motives, whereas literature on the Mexican party system suggests that switching may be related to party system realignment during the democratic transition. Using data on party switching across the political careers of politicians who served as federal deputies between 1997 and 2009, this study argues that party switching in Mexico can primarily be explained by the office-seeking behavior of ambitious politicians. Only in rare instances do politicians switch parties because of policy disagreements, and party system realignment fails to explain a large number of party switches. This article also suggests that the ban on consecutive re-election encourages party switching; after every term in office, Mexican politicians have the opportunity to re-evaluate their party affiliation to continue their careers.

Objective. This article determines if the use of Spanish‐language media among Latinos influences public opinion on various policy issues and group consciousness.Methods. Using a 2004 national public opinion survey of U.S. Latinos, a multivariate analysis is run to determine the effect of language media preference on immigration policy, abortion, same‐sex marriage, and three measures of group consciousness.Results. I find more frequent use of Spanish‐language media leads to more liberal attitudes toward immigration, but has no effect on opinions toward abortion and same‐sex marriage. I also find increased use of Spanish‐language media leads to increased levels of group consciousness.Conclusions. The differences in attitudes are due to the diverging goals of Spanish‐language and English‐language media. The effect of using Spanish‐language media serves to promote a sense of group consciousness among Latinos by reinforcing roots in Latin America and the commonalities among Latinos of varying national origin.

ABSTRACTTo what extent can presidents exert gatekeeping power in opposition-led legislatures? Drawing on a study of roll rates in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, where presidents lack legislative majorities and often face a legislature controlled by the opposition, this article argues that gatekeeping power is divided among multiple actors. It finds that presidents exert weak gatekeeping power over the agenda. While presidents and their parties are rarely defeated in votes related to presidential initiatives, they generally create stable, informal coalitions with opposition parties to pass their bills. Moreover, the agenda-setting power of the president and the president's party is weaker with bills that originate in the legislative branch, where the party is occasionally rolled on legislative initiatives and during the amendment stage if it is not also the median party.

What explains party unity in legislatures? Prior research suggests when candidate selection and electoral rules create incentives for legislators to cultivate a personal vote, party unity should decline. However, previous theories often treat candidate selection rules as exogenous institutions that have independent effects on legislative behavior despite the fact the choice of nomination rules are often an intraparty issue and a key component of partisan electoral strategies. Here, we develop a theory linking candidate selection rules to party unity through the strategic behavior of party leaders. Our main finding is that, under personalized electoral rules, the effects of nomination rules on legislative behavior are conditional on parties' electoral incentives. We test our theory using data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, a case where our results are unlikely to be explained by personal vote‐seeking incentives since legislators are banned from seeking reelection.

Does electing female political leaders reduce gender stereotypes about leadership? Scholars know little about how the increasing presence of female executives alters gender stereotypes about political leadership. Some studies suggest gender stereotypes change slowly because they are embedded in cultural values and structural factors that reinforce traditional gender roles. Other research suggests stereotypes change more quickly with the increasing presence of female political leadership. We address this question by examining the effect of being governed by a female mayor in Mexico. We find that the presence of a current female mayor reduces gender stereotypes among males. However, past female mayors have little effect on current gender stereotypes about leadership. Our results suggest women must be present in executive offices more frequently to produce long-term change in gender stereotypes.